It should be noted, however, that the ODAs, as well as the SEAL and USMC teams, were always in short supply during the three-year existence of this program. Once the local defense force was stood up, the ODA then moved to another village to set up another one. The plan called for a proliferating network of locally defended villages, which required

The commanders stressed that paying salaries would attract the wrong kind of volunteers: mercenaries motivated by money. Instead, joining the CDF should emulate the arbakai and be seen as a civic duty to protect one’s own home and community. Keeping out the Taliban should itself be the reward. Whatever humanitarian or economic aid to be received

Afghanistan has a long history of independent, armed villages. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime, some Afghan tribal communities wanted to fight the remaining Taliban in their areas.  They contacted US Army units in the field, asking only to be officially recognized as allies so that US pilots would not mistake their fighters as Taliban an

Power in Pashtun areas tended to be local, making it critical to understand local institutions that can provide village-level security.” [5] A 2011 RAND essay, “A Long Overdue Adaptation to the Afghan Environment,” reiterated the importance of relying on local Afghan forces: In Afghanistan, an effective aid program—both military and civilia

The question remains as to whether the Singapore model is replicable by other small states or scalable to achieve a high level of food self-sufficiency. Singapore has three main sources to make food available — imports, domestic self-production and overseas production. Small island states like Singapore, while aspiring to achieve more self-relian